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Abstract
In this paper we develop an econometric approach aimed at es-
timating the impact of education on the rate of criminality for the
twenty Italian regions over the period 1980-1985. Starting from a sim-
ple model in which we clearly identify the relationship between the
level of education and the rate of criminality, we propose to test our
theoretical model and to identify the characteristics of crime behaviour
in Italy. In particular, we test which features of our theoretical model
are conﬁrmed by the econometric estimates and which features need a
more careful analysis determined by the peculiarities of the Italian re-
gions. The primary objective of our econometric estimates is to assess
the existence of the relationship between crime and education. But in
order to study the Italian reality we account for its peculiarities (slow-
ness in reaching a ﬁnal judgement, presence of organized crime in Italy,
economic dichotomy between the North and the South of Italy).
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11 Introduction
In this paper we develop an econometric approach aimed at estimating the
impact of education on the rate of criminality for the twenty Italian regions.
Starting from a simple model in which we clearly identify the relationship
between the level of education and the rate of criminality, we propose to test
our theoretical model and to identify the characteristics of crime behaviour
in Italy. In particular, we test which features of our theoretical model are
conﬁrmed by the econometric estimates and which features need a more
careful analysis determined by the peculiarities of the Italian regions.
The primary objective of our econometric estimates is to assess the ex-
istence of the relationship between crime and education. But in order to
study the Italian reality we need to account for its peculiarities.
There are several distinguishing characteristics. First of all, Italian jus-
tice1 is particularly slow and chaotic. Time needed to reach a ﬁnal judgment
is considerably long, implying a slow and ineﬃcient criminal justice system.
Secondly, the relevant presence of organized crime in Italy, in particular in
the South, is a very important feature of the Italian situation. Finally a
strong economic dichotomy exists between the North and the South of Italy.
The North is one of the richest areas of Europe, while the South is aﬀected
by persistent problems: high unemployment rate, few infrastructures and
low growth rate.
Crime represents a relevant social problem in Italy, in partly due to the
strong presence of organized crime above all in southern regions. Despite this
evidence, crime has received little attention and has been almost neglected
by Italian economists.2
Thus, we try to ﬁll this gap introducing a diﬀerent point of view in the
analysis, focusing our attention on the impact of education on crime.
In particular, we follow a similar approach to the one of Marselli and
Vannini, but our work diﬀers from Marselli and Vannini paper along diﬀerent
dimensions. First of all we extend the period for our analysis until 1995,
while it is 1989 in Marselli and Vannini. The extension of the considered
period changes radically the results obtained with respect to Marselli and
Vannini. Secondly, the main purpose of our analysis is to test the implication
of a theoretical model. In other words, we focus our analysis more on testing
a theoretical model than on merely determining from an empirical point of
view the determinants of crime in Italy. In this context, we are particularly
interested in studying the eﬀects of education in aﬀecting the level of crime.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
1In Italy the criminal justice system is based on a codiﬁed criminal law, where the judge
is not a law maker as in many common law countries, in particular anglosaxon countries,
and in which the sentencing process is strictly predetermined by the penal code.
2Very few papers, among the others Marselli and Vannini (1997) and Scorcu and Cellini
(1998) have been produced on this topic.
2brieﬂy review the literature on crime. Section 3 presents the theoretical
framework, the econometric methodology and speciﬁcation and the data
used for our econometric analysis. Section 4 presents the results, the ﬁrst
part focuses on the role of education, while in the second part we discuss
the results considering the particular features of southern regions. Section 5
analyze the crime dynamics, the incidence of crime appears to have inertial
properties (i.e. persistence over time). Section 6 concludes.
2 Review of the Literature
During the last three decades the economics of crime has become a new ﬁeld
for economics investigation, in particular due to the fact that over the same
period of time there has been an outstanding increase in criminal activities,
as conﬁrmed by several empirical studies.3
In 1968 Becker presents a paper that radically changes the way of think-
ing about criminal behaviour. Becker builds the ﬁrst model of criminal
choice, stressing that “some individuals become criminals because of the
ﬁnancial and other rewards from crime compared to legal work, taking ac-
count of the likelihood of apprehension and conviction, and the severity of
punishment”. The model predicts that crime reduction can occur through
reducing the beneﬁts of crime, raising the probability of being caught or the
costs of punishment conditional upon being caught.
Ehrlich (1973) extends the analysis made by Becker, by considering how
income levels and distribution may aﬀect criminal propensity and crime rate.
He argues that payoﬀs to crime, especially property crime, depend primarily
on the “opportunities provided by potential victims of crime”.
Together with the relationship between economic conditions and crime,
one of the main issues in the pioneering studies by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich
(1973 and 1975) is the assessment of the eﬀects of police presence, convic-
tions, and the severity of punishments on the level of criminal activity.
Block and Heineke (1975) criticize Becker’s and Ehrlich’s work and in-
troduce time spent in legal and illegal activities in the utility function of
their model, diﬀerentiating from Becker and Ehrlich that considered time
allocation only implicitly through its eﬀects on wealth.
Since the beginning of 80s, Becker’s paper opens the door to a new ﬁeld
of empirical research whose main purpose is to verify and study the eco-
nomic and social determinants of crime. The focus of these contributions
has changed from the pure testing of the deterrence hypothesis to the anal-
ysis of socioeconomic determinants like poverty,4 social exclusion, wage and
income inequality,5 unemployment,6 cultural and family background, level
3Fajnzylber et al., 2000, 2002; Freeman, 1991, 1996 and 1999; Glaeser, 1999.
4Huang and Laing, 2003.
5Chiu and Madden, 1998; Burdett et al., 1999; Kelly, 2000.
6Witt et al., 1998; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Calvo-Armengol and Zenou,
3of education attained and other economic and social factors that may aﬀect
individual’s propensity to commit crimes such as cultural characteristics (i.e.
religion and colonial heritage),7 age and sex (i.e. young males are said to be
more prone to violence),8 the availability of ﬁre arms in the countries and
existence of illegal drug-related activities.9
Recent literature10 has emphasized the role of education as an important
determinant of crime. Education has a multiple role in deterring crime: it
raises skills and abilities and then improves labour market perspectives thus
implying a higher opportunity cost of crime and it has a non-market eﬀect
that aﬀects the preferences of individuals.
Becker and Ehrlich have already stressed that an increase in law-abidingness
due, say, to ‘education’ would reduce the incentive to enter illegal activities
and thus reduce the number of oﬀenses.
Several studies have shown that criminals tend to be less educated and
from poorer economic backgrounds than non criminals. Freeman (1991,
1996), Grogger (1995, 1998) and more recently Lochner and Moretti (2001)
attempt to clearly identify the relationships between crime and education.
Most of the contributions on the eﬀects of education on crime stress how
education raises individuals’ skills and abilities, thus increases the returns to
legitimate work, raising the opportunity costs of illegal behaviour. But there
exist beneﬁts from education that are not taken in account by individuals,
this implies that the social return of education is higher than its private
return (Lochner and Moretti, 2001). Education has a non-market eﬀect
that aﬀects the preferences of individuals. This eﬀect (“civilization eﬀect”)
makes criminal decision more costly in psychological terms.
Lochner (1999) uses a 2 period model to look at some simple dynamic
relations between education, work and crime. In his paper, he emphasizes
the role of human capital accumulation on criminal behavior and the econo-
metric results conﬁrm that “both high school graduation and ability directly
lower criminal propensities”. In a successive paper joint with Moretti (2001),
Lochner estimates “the eﬀect of education on participation in criminal ac-
tivity accounting for endogeneity of schooling”. The results obtained allow
Lochner and Moretti (2001) to conclude that “schooling signiﬁcantly reduces
criminal activity”.
Ad i ﬀerent approach is followed by David Usher (1997). He argues that
education may also have a “civilization” eﬀect, tending to reduce the inci-
dence of criminal activity. In other words, “education promotes good citi-
zenship. Education does more than teach skills to enhance one’s capacity
to earn income. It perpetuates the values of society, enculturates people to
2003.
7Fajnzylber et al., 2002.
8Among the others Freeman (1991) and Grogger (1998).
9Levitt and Venkatesh (1998).
10Usher, 1997; Lochner, 1999; Lochner and Moretti, 2001.
4serve their communities, and promotes the virtues of hard work and hon-
esty” (p. 368).
Thus, education has a multiple role in deterring crime. In fact, as sug-
gested by Freeman (1994) and Lochner (1999) education may raise skills and
abilities and then increasing wage level and work opportunities, but at the
same time it can have a “civilization” eﬀect, as stated by Usher (1997).
3M o d e l S p e c i ﬁcations and Estimation Methods
3.1 Theoretical Framework
We present a simple economic model of education, work and crime, in order
to provide some intuition on the impact of education on crime. The model
does not mean to be a complete description of criminal behaviour, but it
represents a useful starting point for our empirical study.
We consider a dynamic two-period model of individual behaviour in
which individuals decide how to allocate their disposable time among ed-
ucation, work and crime. Individual disposable time sum up to unity (lt +
st + dt =1and lt,s t,d t ≥ 0) where lt, dt and st are respectively the frac-
tion of time devoted to work, crime and education; subscript t denotes time
(either 1 or 2). During their lives agents optimally choose whether to be
engaged or not in criminal activities and their level of education in period
1. For simplicity in period 2 s2 =0 ; namely individuals can choose only
between work and crime. Denote with wt the wage rate; then, income from
legitimate activities is yt = wthtlt,w h e r eht represents the level of ability,
deﬁned as ht = ht(st−1). Individual ability is increasing at a decreasing rate
in the level of education acquired in the previous period, we assume that
h1(s0) is given.
If an agent is engaged in criminal activity she obtains a return R(dt,h t)
with probability (1 − πa),w h e r eπa represents the probability of being ap-
prehended and punished. The function R(.) depends on the time devoted to
crime activities and on individual ability. Returns from crime are supposed
to be increasing at a decreasing rate in individual ability and in time devoted






The punishment is represented by P(dt) a n dm e a s u r e di nc o n s u m p t i o n
terms. Individuals consume their income from legal work and crime, and
receive a utility u(ct). Given the wage rate in the ﬁr s ta n di nt h es e c o n d




c1 + ρ−1c2 (1)
under
5c1 = w1h1(s0)(1 − s1 − d1)+( 1− πa)R(d1,h 1(s0)) − πaP(d1)
and
c2 = w2h2(s1)(1 − d2)+( 1− πa)R(d2,h 2(s1)) − πaP(d2)
The FOCs with respect to s1, d1and d2 f o ra ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o na r e :
d1 : w1h1(s0)=( 1− πa)Rd1(d1,h 1(s0)) − πaPd1(d1) (2)
s1 : w1h1(s0)=ρ−1 £
w2h0
2(s1)(1 − d2)+( 1− πa)Rh2h2(s1)
¤
(3)
d2 : w2h2(s1)=( 1− πa)Rd(d2,h 2(s1)) − πaPd2(d2) (4)
Equations (2) and (4) suggest two channels through which education
can aﬀect criminal decisions. First, education increases individual returns
from work, thereby increasing the opportunity costs of crime.11 Second,
education may aﬀect the net marginal returns to crime. Equation (3) allows
us to study the costs and returns of education. On one hand, a higher
level of education implies higher returns both from work and crime. On the
other hand, an individual with a high level of education if apprehended and
convicted experiences greater losses in earnings and then it is likely that she
will be more crime adverse than a less educated individual.
More time invested in education in the ﬁrst period implies higher ex-
pected returns in the legal sector in the second period, increasing the oppor-
tunity cost of crime, viceversa more time spent in criminal activities during
the ﬁrst period, reducing the time spent for schooling, implies lower expected
returns in the legal sector in the second period and this leads to a higher
l e v e lo fc r i m e .
An increase in the wage rate has a negative eﬀect on crime, but we need
to distinguish between adolescents and adults. In adulthood an increase of
wage unambiguously reduces time spent in criminal activities, while during
adolescence this implies that education is costly in terms of foregone income,
then individuals will prefer to allocate more time to legal work than to
education. Then, it may be that higher wages during adolescence could
increase the level of crime in adulthood.
Finally, prevention and eﬀective law enforcement policies will allow to
reduce the overall crime rates, an increase in the probability of apprehen-
sion (πa) reduces the level of time spent in committing crime. Increasing
the probability of apprehension corresponds to a reduction of the expected
return from illegal activities.
Our analysis suggests that a correct mix of enforcement and education
investment reduces crime. Increases in enforcement and in education are
likely to considerably aﬀect the level of crime and to be important compo-
nents of an eﬀective crime-ﬁghting strategy.








, crime is decreasing in education. We argue that for property
crimes, education is likely to have little eﬀect on their returns.
63.2 Data: Source and Description
Our data set comprises annual observations from the twenty Italian regions
over the period 1980-1995. Crime data, that represent the dependent vari-
able, are taken from CRENoS.12 We utilize the number of total crimes, the
number of total crimes against property and against the person normalized
by population, taken from ISTAT. The explanatory variables are separated
into three groups: education, deterrence variables and socioeconomic vari-
ables.
Education (EDU), taken from ISTAT, is deﬁned as the ratio between
students enrolled in high-school and in university and the total population
of each region. Deterrence variables, taken from CRENoS, are: quickness
of conclusion of Istruttoria (IST)a n dA p p e l l o( APP) obtained as inverse
of average length of judicial process respectively for Istruttoria and Primo
Grado13 and for Appello and Cassazione14; the percentage of crimes com-
mitted by unknown oﬀender (UNK), that we use to proxy the probability
of apprehension, obtained as the ratio of crimes committed by unknown
oﬀender to all recorded crimes in each category and police force15 (POL)
normalized by population.
We complete the data set by adding a set of socioeconomic variables
taken from ISTAT. In particular, we have constructed an index representing
the rate of employment (EMP)d e ﬁned as the ratio between the number of
employed and the population for each region, an index of labour productivity
(PRO) at 1990 constant prices, an index of the rate of growth of real added
value (GRO), an index of average regional wages (WAG) at 1990 constant
price, and ﬁnally an index of the presence of public sector (PUB) obtained
as the ratio between overall consumption of public administration and the
added value of each region, both at 1990 constant prices.
In Figure 1 we present the behaviour of property crimes per 1.000 inhab-
itants over the period 1980-1995. In order to facilitate the analysis we have
aggregated the twenty Italian regions in northern regions, central regions
and southern regions. As it clearly appears from Figure 1 property crimes
present an upward trend over the considered period. From 1980 to 1990
they have substantially remained stable, but after 1990 they peaked again.
The trend is similar for all Italian regions.
Total crimes (Figure 2) per capita present a behaviour similar to that
of property crimes. Both for total crimes and property crimes the trend
is overall increasing in Italy, even if over the period 1977-1990 southern
regions have experienced a reduction, while central and northern regions
12Centre for North South Economic Research.
13Istruttoria and Primo grado represents the ﬁrst stage of the entire judicial proceeding.
14Appello and Cassazione represent respectively the second and the third stage of judi-
cial proceeding.
15Italian police force is composed by Carabinieri, Polizia and Guardia di Finanza. All
these three bodies of the Italian police force operate at national level.
7have experienced a slight increase. Starting from 1991 a sharp increase has
aﬀected all Italian regions.
The picture drastically changes by considering crimes against the person
and murders (Figure 3 and Figure 4). They have experienced a constant
reduction until 1990. After 1990 crimes against the person have more than
doubled in ﬁve years. Northern regions have a level of crimes against the
person constantly higher than the national average, while central regions are
on average even if they present a great variability.
Within the category of crime against the person, murders present a con-
stant and stable growth with a peak in 1991. In less than 30 years murders
per capita are more than doubled. The situation is very diﬀerent across
Italy, and in particular, southern regions present a level of murders per
capita considerably higher (3-4 times) than central and northern regions.
Figure (5) presents the rate of education (high school and university)
deﬁned as the number of high school and university students normalized
by regional population. Education sharply increase until 1990. After this
year there is a consistent reduction that aﬀects northern and central regions,
while it remains stable in southern regions.
3.3 Econometric Methodology and Speciﬁcation
The theoretical model we want to test is basically an individual’s choice
model between education, work and crime. For this reason in the ﬁrst part
of our analysis we consider the simplest version of the model, in which we
test the relationship between crime and education, while in the following
parts of the present work we will test more complex models in which we use
two diﬀerent set of control variables .
In particular, in the second model we not only test the relationship
between crime and education, but also the role of the criminal justice and
police force by adding a set of control variables regarding the justice and
police system as UNK, POL, IST and APP In the third model we introduce
the economic variables (PRO, EMP, WAG, GRO and PUB)a n dﬁnally in
the fourth model, presented in section 5, we analyse the dichotomy existing
between the North and the South of Italy and the presence of organized
crime in southern regions.
The ﬁrst equation we test is very simple and relates crime to education:
crimi = α + β1edui + εi (5)
where edui represents the level of education in region i as deﬁn e di nt h e
previous section, crimi the number of crimes recorded in region i.
Our work aims at identifying if it exists a clear relationship between
education and crime, in particular in our analysis we focus on property
crimes, as we discussed above those type of crimes are more likely to depend
on economic motivations than violent crime (i.e. murder, assault, rape, etc.).
8We test (??)t h r i c e .I naﬁrst model, crimi represents the total number
of crimes recorded in region i; in a second model it identiﬁes the number of
property crimes recorded in region i and ﬁnally it represents the number of
crimes against the person recorded in region i.
We expect an inverse relationship between education and crime, when
crimi is respectively the total number of crimes and the number of property
crimes, while we expect no relationship when crimi represents the number
of crimes against the person.
There are several reasons to guess that an increase in the level of educa-
tion will imply a reduction in the level of crime (total and property crimes).
Education may inﬂuence the decision to engage in criminal activities in
several ways and there are several reasons to believe that education may
reduce crime rate. First, higher levels of educational attainment are associ-
ated with a higher wage rate: higher wage rates raises the opportunity cost
of criminal behaviour and may reduce crime participation. Second, educa-
tion (or schooling) may alter personal preferences in an indirect way, which
may aﬀect decisions to engage in crime. In particular, education may have
a sort of “civilization” eﬀect16 a n dt h e nc o u l dr e p r e s e n tav a l i dp o l i c yi n
preventing crime.
Hence, education appears to be an important variable in determining
crime rate both for its direct economic implications and for its “civilization”
eﬀect.17
As written above, we present a second model in which a new set of
variables concerning police force, criminal justice and probability of appre-
hension is added and tested. This second model can be represented as:
crimi = α + β1edui +
5 X
j=2
βjxji + εi (6)
where x2i is police force in region i (POL), x3i represents the quickness
of conclusion of Istruttoria (IST), x4i represents the quickness of conclu-
sion of Appello (APP)a n dx5i is the percentage of crimes committed by
unknown oﬀender as the ratio of crimes committed by unknown oﬀender to
all recorded crimes in each category (UNK).
We expect a negative sign for variables x2i, x3i, x4i and a positive one
for x5i. These variables capture the eﬃciency of police force and the quick-
ness and eﬃciency of criminal justice; in other words, the quicker is the
16See Usher (1997) and Fajnzylber et al. (2002).
17Some studies have stressed how a positive correlation between crime and education
may exist. In particular, a higher level of education may increase the returns in the
illegal sector more than the returns in the legal sector (Ehrlich, 1975). Even if, the eﬀect
of education could be ap r i o r iambiguos, it is reasonable to think, on the basis of the
previous considerations, that the eﬀe c to fe d u c a t i o no nc r i m ei sn e g a t i v ea n dt h e nt h e
sign of β1 is negative.
9criminal justice, the lower will be the number of crimes; in the same way,
more policemen increase the probability of apprehension and this leads to a
reduction in the number of crimes. While, the bigger is the probability of
not being apprehend the bigger will be the number of crimes.
Finally, we enrich the model represented by equation (6) including a
second set of control variables containing the economic variables. Then we
have a third model to test:






βjxji + εi (7)
where x6i is the rate of regional employment, x7i and x8i are respectively
labour productivity and regional growth rate, x9i is average wage in the legal
sector, and ﬁnally x10i represents the ratio between overall consumption of
public administration and the added value of each region.
Then, we expect a negative sign for x8i and x9i.I n f a c t s , i t a p p e a r s
widely recognized that an increase in the growth rate and a higher level of
legal wage is related to a reduction in the level of crime.
We expect a positive sign for x10i. Previous studies have stressed the fact
that a pervasive and broad public sector may have distortionary eﬀects on
private incentives. Furthermore, a too extensive public sector may lead to a
misallocation of public resources and may generate criminal behaviours.18
Contrary to common intuition it is not straightforward to establish the
eﬀect of employment x6i and labour productivity x7i on crime. In fact,
as conﬁrmed by several econometric studies, unemployment per se is not a
relevant and signiﬁcant determinant of crime rate and this relationship be-
tween crime and unemployment appears to be very sensitive to econometric
speciﬁcation.
According to us, a very similar analysis can be used for labour produc-
tivity. In fact, if on one hand, it is reasonable to guess that an increase
in labour productivity implies a lower level of crime because of the higher
wages, on the other hand it is likely that the number of crimes, and in par-
ticular property crimes, will be higher where people are richer. Ap r i o r i ,w e
cannot guess which one of these two eﬀects will be bigger.
We estimate our models (5-7) by using 5 diﬀerent techniques: i) OLS
estimator; ii) Fixed Eﬀects (FE) estimator; iii) Random Eﬀects (RE) esti-
mator; iv) Fixed Eﬀects estimator with time eﬀects and ﬁnally v) Random
Eﬀects estimator with time eﬀects.
We estimate the model by using all the above described techniques,
among which we will choose the best technique by using the Poolability
test (OLS vs FEM), the Lagrange Multiplier test by Breusch and Pagan
(1980) to test if a Panel Data Model (FEM/REM) has to be preferred to
18Costabile and Giannola, 1996.
10an OLS estimation. and in order to choose between FEM and REM we use
the Hausman test, whose null hypothesis is that the unobserved explanatory
variables is orthogonal to the regressor. Finally, we test the signiﬁcance of
time eﬀects, in order to choose the best speciﬁcation form for our analysis.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Crime and Italy
In this section we present the results of the regressions on total crimes, prop-
erty crimes and crimes against the person without considering the dichotomy
between northern and southern regions. Our basic equation includes only
education as explanatory variable. Then we add two diﬀerent sets of control
variables: deterrence variables (probability of apprehension, police force,
quickness of proceedings) and socioeconomic variables (employment rate,
growth rate, wage rate, weight of public sector and labour productivity).
These additional regressions are designed to test both the robustness of our
‘core’ results and the relevance of other potentially important crime deter-
minants.
Table 3 presents static ﬁxed-eﬀect estimations with individual and time
eﬀects, as Table 1 reveals that this is the preferred speciﬁcation form for our
analysis according to the statistical tests conducted. Table 4 shows a second
set of estimations, in which we have used only the signiﬁcant regressors from
the previous set of estimations.
As Tables 3 and 4 show, education is signiﬁcantly and negatively cor-
related with total and property crimes, while, as expected, the coeﬃcient
of education for crimes against the person is not signiﬁcant. This result is
robust to heteroskedasticity and is not aﬀected by adding the two diﬀer-
ent sets of control variables aimed at detecting the eﬀect of deterrence and
socioeconomic variables.
When we pass to consider the eﬀect of deterrence variables, model de-
noted by (b) in Tables 3 and 4, we get a more puzzled picture. In fact, on
one hand IST presents the expected (negative) sign and is signiﬁcant and
robust to heteroskedasticity for total crimes and property crimes, while is
not signiﬁcant for crimes against the person. On the other hand, APP is
signiﬁcant only for crime against the person.
The fraction of crimes committed by unknown oﬀender, used to proxy
the probability of apprehension, is signiﬁcant and with the expected sign in
the case of property crime and crime against the person, even if it is not
robust to heteroskedasticity in the ﬁrst case, while is not signiﬁcant in the
case of total crimes.
Police force, contrary to what one would expect is positively correlated
with the number of crimes for every typology of crimes, albeit in some cases is
not signiﬁcant. This result, at ﬁrst sight contradictory and counterintuitive,
11can be justiﬁed observing that it may exist a relationship of reverse causality
between the level of crime and police force. In other words, government
spends more for police force where the number of crimes is higher.
It is worth to notice that, in models denoted by (b), some of the variables
used, even if presenting the expected sign, are not statistically signiﬁcant.
The non signiﬁcance of some of the considered variables, in our opinion,
may be due to the type of crime analyzed. As we widely discussed in this
and in the previous sections, our study focuses on property crimes. The
theoretical and econometric models conﬁrm our intuition on the existence
of a relationship among education, the other control variables and property
crimes, but we are not able to extend our analysis and considerations to other
typologies of crimes. Little can be said about the determinants of crimes
against the person, that in most cases are determined by unpredictable
reasons.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt os t r e s st h a tt h es e to f deterrence variables is statis-
tically signiﬁcant. In other words, our basic model denoted by (a) is less
explanatory than model denoted by (b). We have tested the signiﬁcance
of the regressors (Table (2)) and we can unequivocally conclude that the
addition of this set of control variables better oﬀ the forecasting capacity of
our models.
Education and deterrence variables are able to oﬀer a good explanation
of criminal behaviour in Italy during the period 1980-1995. R2 are found
to be higher than 80% for total and property crimes and 60% for crimes
against the person.
Then, we extend our analysis adding a second set of control variables.
This second set aims at analyzing the role of socioeconomic variables as
determinants of crime behaviour. Also in this case the set of economic
variables is statistically signiﬁcant. In other words, models denoted by (a)
and (b) are less explanatory than model including socioeconomic variables,
denoted by (c).
The regression results indicate that wage rate in the legal sector is neg-
atively correlated with every category of crimes, as expected. This result
conﬁrms the predictions of our theoretical model; a higher wage in the legal
sector is associated to a higher cost of committing crime and consequently
it implies a lower rate of crime. Growth rate, even though has the expected
(negative) sign, is not signiﬁcant for every category of crimes. Employment
rate and labour productivity are positively correlated with every types of
crimes and are strongly signiﬁcant also by considering for heteroskedastic-
ity. The positive eﬀect of labour productivity can be due to the existence
of two opposite eﬀects on crime rate. On one hand, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that an increase in labour productivity leads to a lower level of crime
because of the higher wages; on the other hand, it is likely that the number
of crimes, and in particular property crimes, will be higher where people
are richer, we can suppose that the second eﬀect is bigger. It is worth to
12notice that the relationship existing between crime and unemployment is
not clear and unambiguous, and appears to be very sensitive to econometric
speciﬁcation (Freeman, 1994 and Masciandaro, 1999). Finally, public sector
is positively correlated with every category of crimes rate, as expected. This
result conﬁrms what obtained by Marselli and Vannini (1997) and Costa-
bile and Giannola (1996) that a pervasive and broad public sector may have
distortionary eﬀects on private incentives, may lead to a misallocation of
public resources and may generate criminal behaviours, as corruption.
4.2 Crime and South
In this section we account for the economic and social diﬀerences existing
between southern regions and the rest of Italy. South of Italy is aﬀected
by chronic problems, in particular a pervasive and strong presence of orga-
nized crime and a structural backwardness. By using dummy variables for
southern regions we aim at obtaining more robust and less contradictory
results.
In order to catch these and other eﬀects, we test the following economet-
ric model:

















 + εit (8)
where DS is a slope dummy variable whose value is 1 for southern re-
gions (Campania, Calabria, Puglia, Basilicata, Sardinia and Sicily) and 0
otherwise. In other words in model (8) it has been used a number of slope
dummy variables exactly equal to the number of explanatory variables in
model (7). Table (5) reports the results of regression analyses based on
equation (8).
The results are considerably aﬀected by considering the distinguishing
characteristics of southern regions. The eﬀect of the set of deterrence vari-
ables is considerably less evident in southern regions. IST and APP are not
signiﬁcant for every category of crimes and UNK is signiﬁcant only in the
case of total crimes. Police force, even presenting a negative sign, results to
be not signiﬁcant in southern regions. Overall “justice” variables appears
to be not signiﬁcant, with some exceptions, and this is in contrast with the
results obtained for the rest of Italy. The non signiﬁcance of deterrence
variables can be interpreted as a consequence of the presence of organized
crime. In other words, organized crime considerably aﬀects the eﬃciency of
criminal justice and eﬀectiveness of police force.
13The analysis of the socioeconomic variables gives the opportunity to
clearly perceive the strong dichotomy existing between northern and south-
ern regions. All the socioeconomic variables present an opposite sign respect
to estimations for Italy as a whole. Employment and labour productivity
are negatively correlated to crime rate for every category of crimes, but are
signiﬁcant only for total crimes. Growth rate is positively and signiﬁcantly
correlated to crime rate for every category of crime, this results is robust
to control for heteroskedasticity. Wage rate is negatively and signiﬁcantly
correlated with total and property crimes.
These results should be considered together with the positive sign of ed-
ucation for southern regions. In fact, it is likely that the high level of high
school and university enrollment in southern regions may be due to the high
level of unemployment. In other words, high schools and universities repre-
sent a valid alternative to unemployment. Adolescent choose to go on with
their studies in order to avoid the high probability of being unemployed and
the related psychological costs. In this sense education does not represent
a way in which acquiring higher skills to be used in the labour market, but
simply a way in which postponing unemployment problems.
Finally, public sector is not signiﬁcant for every category of crime. This
may be due to the fact that the pervasiveness of the public sector more than
aﬀecting crime behaviour is related to corruption attitudes and behaviours
that are not taken in account in our analysis.
Concluding we can state that the economic and social context consid-
erably aﬀects crime rate. The use of dummy variables try to capture the
presence of organized crime and economic underdevelopment of southern
regions, but it is diﬃcult to distinguish between these two eﬀects for their
probable correlation. Organized crime considerably reduces the eﬃciency of
criminal justice and eﬀectiveness of police force.
The Italian situation varies considerably across regions and the existence
of a striking socioeconomic dichotomy between the North and the South of
Italy aﬀects crime rate in Italian regions. The distinguishing characteristics
and peculiarities existing between northern and southern regions have to
be taken in account in order to properly identify the determinants of crime
across Italy.
5 Crime Dynamics
Individual’s past experience in criminal activities is an important under-
lying variable that aﬀects in several ways the decision to commit a crime.
First, criminals can learn-by-doing, which means that acquiring the adequate
criminal know-how and abilities the costs of carrying out criminal acts may
decrease over time.19 Second, criminals who have been arrested tend to be
19Case and Katz, 1991.
14stigmatized in the legal labour market, then they will have less employment
opportunities and expected wage.20 Third, a sort of peer or network eﬀect,
individuals who have joined the crime industry and work with criminals tend
to have a reduced moral threshold. This eﬀect is opposite to the positive
eﬀect of education and regard the “moral” sphere.
Thus, the incidence of crime appears to have inertial properties (i.e.
persistence) that are noted in the theoretical literature and documented in
the micro and macro empirical work.21
These arguments strongly suggest the possibility of criminal inertia; in
other words present crime incidence is explained to some extent by its past
incidence. Our model shows that the bigger the amount of time spent in
criminal activities in the ﬁrst period, the lower the expected returns in the
legal sector in the second period because of the reduction of the time spent
for schooling; this, in turn, leads to a higher level of crime in the second
period.
We test a partial adjustment model of the form:
(CRIMEi,t − CRIMEi,t−1)=λ(CRIME∗
i,t − CRIMEi,t−1) (9)
where:
CRIME∗
i,t = Φ(EDUi,t,POL i,t,WAG i,t) (10)
that yields:
CRIMEi,t = γCRIMEi,t−1+Φ[EDUi,t,POL i,t,WAG i,t]+ηi+ηt+εi,t (11)
where γ =1−λ, Φ allows for lags in explanatory regressors, ηi and ηt repre-
sent region-speciﬁc and time-speciﬁce ﬀects respectively and the subscripts
i and t represent region and time period.
We use a Within Group estimator to estimate eq. (11). The Within
Group estimator eliminates the OLS bias by transforming the equation to
wipe out the individual eﬀect components, as original observations are ex-
pressed as deviations from the individual means. For panels where the
number of the time periods is small relative to the cross sectional dimen-
sion, this transformation may cause a non-negligible correlation between the
transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error leading to
biased and inconsistent estimated parameters. This correlation remains as
the number of individuals in the sample increase; however, in the case of
large T panels this correlation vanishes and the Within Group estimator
leads to consistent estimates, provided that tests for serial correlation are
satisﬁed.
Table 6 presents our empirical results. The ﬁrst column reports results
obtained when we use property crimes as a proxy for CRIME; the second
20Grogger, 1995.
21Glaeser et al., 1996; Fajnzylber et al., 1998.
15column reports parameters estimated when the total number of crimes is
instead used.
Our model ﬁts well the data. R2 are found to be higher than 60%.O u r
results are robust to heterosckedasticity; moreover, the tests for ﬁrst and
second order serial correlation are satisﬁed, conﬁrming the validity of the
assumption of serially uncorrelated errors. The coeﬃcients associated with
the variables object of this paper, CRIMEi,t−1 and EDU are strongly sig-
niﬁcant; signs are consistent with our theoretical predictions. In particular,
CRIMEi,t−1 is positive, implying that criminal activities display an inertial
behavior; adjustment coeﬃcients range between 50 and 60%. The coeﬃ-
cients associated with EDUi,t and EDUi,t−1 are negative, suggesting that
both present and past education has a negative impact on property crimes.
As expected, police force displays a negative eﬀect on both property
and total crime; however their eﬀect is small, and the estimated parameters
are statistically not signiﬁcant. Finally, the eﬀect of WAG on crime is
ambiguous. Current wage is positively correlated with crime, while past
wage display a negative eﬀect. If on the one hand, it is reasonable to guess
that an increase in wage implies a lower level of crime because it raises the
opportunity cost of criminal behaviour, on the other hand it is likely that the
number of crimes, and in particular property crimes, will be higher where
people are richer. Ap r i o r i ,w ec a n n o tg u e s sw h i c ho n eo ft h e s et w oe ﬀects
will be bigger.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Our empirical analysis, both static and dynamic, conﬁrms the existence of
a relationship between the level of crime and education.
For what it concerns the static analysis the relationship between crime
and education is stronger for property crimes than for total crimes or crimes
against the person, in fact, as previously asserted, property crimes are more
likely to depend on economic motivations than other types of crimes. The
empirical investigation has conﬁrmed the prediction of our theoretical model.
Education and wages are negatively correlated with the level of crime and the
proxy used for the probability of apprehension behaves accordingly to our
analysis. Our results are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity
and are not aﬀected by adding two diﬀerent sets of control variables aimed
at detecting the eﬀect of justice (probability of apprehension, number of
police force, quickness of proceedings) and economic situation (employment
rate, growth rate, wage, weight of public sector and labour productivity).
The picture changes when we consider the socioeconomic diﬀerences ex-
isting between southern regions and the rest of Italy. South Italy is aﬀected
by chronic problems, in particular a pervasive and strong presence of or-
ganized crime and a structural backwardness. By using dummy variables
16for southern regions we obtain more robust and less contradictory results.
The Italian situation varies considerably across regions and the existence
of a striking socioeconomic dichotomy between the North and the South of
Italy aﬀects crime rate in Italian regions. The distinguishing characteristics
and peculiarities existing between northern and southern regions have to
be taken in account in order to properly identify the determinants of crime
across Italy.
Finally, the dynamic estimation conﬁrms the theoretical predictions of
our model. Property and total crimes exhibit a persistence over time, im-
plying that the incidence of crime appears to have inertial properties. Ed-
ucation, both present and past, has a negative eﬀect on crime. Then the
negative impact of education on crime is conﬁrmed also in a dynamic con-
text, showing how educational eﬀects persist over time.
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Figure 5: Students enrolled in high school and university per 1.000 inhabitantsTable 1
Test for the choiche of the model
Total Crimes Property Crimes Crimes against person
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Test for Poolability* 981,6 293,1 220,8 347,4 215,9 192,5 175,9 199,7 186,4
Fixed and Random Eﬀects Model without time dummies
Lagrange Multiplier Test** 981,6 606,4 145,7 974,4 256,8 107,2 366,8 416,4 346,4
Hausmann Test*** 1,6 11,2 75,3 1,6 25,9 70,0 0,1 12,1 14,2
Fixed and Random Eﬀects Model with time dummies
Lagrange Multiplier Test 993,6 609,1 145,7 997,9 256,8 109,4 376,4 417,1 346,9
Hausmann Test 29,7 22,7 20,6 24,2 124,6 100,5 1,3 5,7 14,7
Test for time eﬀects**** 180,5 106,9 54,8 215,4 129,8 62,1 66,4 40,7 67,0
* Pooled model vs. FEM, high values of Poolability test favor FEM over Pooled model, ** Pooled model vs.
FEM/REM, high values of LM favor FEM/REM over Pooled model, *** Fixed vs. Random Eﬀects, high (low)
values of Hausmann test favor FEM (REM), **** High values of test for time eﬀects favor the introduction of time
eﬀects in the model
Table 2
“Nested” tests for the choiche of the model
Nested Tests for model choice
Test joint signiﬁcance of the regressors 4,3 36,0 39,0 5,9 39,7 41,5 1,2 12,2 12,7
Model (a) vs Model (b) 21,9 24,3 28,6
Model (a) vs Model (c) 46,9 51,6 39,7
Model (b) vs Model (c) 22,6 19,7 22,7Table 3
Eﬀects of economic and social variables on crimes
Total Crimes Property Crimes Crimes against person
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
EDU -1,097 -1,201 -0,585 -0,904 -0,894 -0,454 -0,074 -0,025 0,037
(-6.16)*** (-6.90)*** (-3,16)*** (-6.59)*** (-6.54)*** (-3.09)*** (-3.05)*** (-1.04) (1.43)
[-2.06]** [-2.39]** [-1.93]* [-2.42]** [-2.32]** [-2.02]** [-1.08] [-0.38] [0.67]
POL 0,017 0,030 0,007 0,017 0,001 0,003
(2.37)** (4.13)*** (1.20) (2.92)*** (0.96) (2.79)***
[1.17] [2.32]** [0.61] [1.90]* [0.56] [1.98]**
IST -5,5E-04 -5,1E-04 -3,6E-04 -3,1E-04 -3,4E-05 -1,8E-05
(-4.05)*** (-3.92)*** (-3.36)*** (-3.04)*** (-1.90)* (-1.03)
[-2.24]** [-2.19]** [-1.92]* [-1.65]* [-1.28] [-0.75]
APP 4,1E-09 4,0E-07 -5,4E-08 2,4E-07 -4,5E-07 -4,3E-07
(0.00) (0.26) (-0.043) (-0.20) (-2.10)** (-2.14)**
[0.00] [0.54] [-0.39] [-0.53] [-2.85]*** [-3.08]**
UNK -0,095 -0,052 0,322 0,330 0,042 0,042
(-1.13) (-0.66) (2.23)** (2.42)** (6.85)*** (-7.29)***
[-0.38] [-0.29] [1.34] [1.94]* [2.82]*** [-3.29]***
EMP 0,340 2,357 0,269
(5.23)*** (4.59)*** (3.08)***
[2.92]*** [2.99]*** [1.76]*
PRO 0,032 0,024 0,004
(6.09)*** (5.75)*** (5.58)***
[5.09]*** [4.49]*** [5.06]***
GRO -0,154 -0,077 -0,004
(-0.77) (-0.48) (-0.14)
[-0.83] [-0.67] [-0.14]
WAG -0,028 -0,022 -0,003
(-2.36)** (-2.35)** (-2.07)**
[-1.83]* [-1.84]* [-1.56]
PUB 0,337 2,672 0,601
(3.27)*** (3.27)*** (4.34)***
[2.47]** [2.45]** [3.00]***




0,80 0,82 0,85 0,82 0,83 0,85 0,51 0,59 0,63
Notes:
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in square brackets.
***, ** and * indicate coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.Table 4
Eﬀects of economic and social variables on crimes (reduced form)
Total Crimes Property Crimes Crimes against person
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
EDU -1,097 -1,178 -0,587 -0,904 -0,867 -0,463
(-6.16)*** (-6.84)*** (-3.24)*** (-6.59)*** (-6.44)*** (-3.19)***
[-2.06]** [-2.39]** [-2.00]** [-2.42]** [-2.42]** [-2.07]**
POL 0,017 0,031 0,017 0,003
(-2.39)** (4.24)*** (2.97)*** (3.31)***
[-2.10]** [2.24]** [1.91]* [2.42]**
IST -5,6E-04 -5,1E-04 -3,9E-04 -3,1E-04 -3,8E-05
(-4.12)*** (-3.96)*** (-3.70)*** (-3.04)*** (-2.18)**




UNK 0,321 0,322 0,044 0,039
(2.23)** (2.38)** (7.83)*** (7.14)***
[1.97]* [1.85]* [3.06]*** [2.90]***
EMP 0,335 2,314 0,234
(5.27)*** (4.58)*** (2.86)***
[2.75]*** [2.91]*** [1.75]*




WAG -0,028 -0,022 -0,003
(-2.46)** (-2.36)** (-2.08)**
[-1.76]* [-1.83]* [-1.76]*
PUB 0,348 2,718 0,575
(3.42)*** (3.37)*** (4.46)***
[2.73]*** [2.61]** [2.55]**




0,80 0,82 0,85 0,82 0,84 0,86 0,59 0,63
Notes:
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in square brackets.
***, ** and * indicate coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.Table 5
Eﬀects of economic and social variables on crimes (South)
Total Crimes Property Crimes Crimes against person
Xj Ds∗ Xj Xj Ds∗ Xj Xj Ds∗ Xj
EDU -0,646 1,259 -0,682 0,811 0,006 0,173
(-2.19)** (2.23)** (-2.87)*** (1.86)* (0.16) (2.32)**
[-1.85]* [1.86]* [-2.33]** [1.44] [0.14] [2.13]**
POL 0,024 -0,024 0,016 -0,025 0,002 -0,001
(2.87)*** (-1.04) (2.48)** (-1.34) (2.21)** (-0.36)
[2.08]** [-1.29] [-1.83]* [-1.60] [2.31]** [-0.38]
IST -6,7E-04 5,2E-04 -4,1E-04 2,9E-04 2,4E-07 -1,5E-05
(-4.21)*** (2.52)** (-3.23)*** (1.78)* (0.01) (-0.60)
[-2.72]*** [2.45]** [-1.93]* [1.52] [0.01] [-0.49]
APP 4,4E-07 -2,4E-06 3,9E-07 -4,0E-06 -4,4E-07 -4,0E-08
(0.30) (-0.53) (0.33) (-1.07) (-2.22)** (-0.06)
[0.59] [-0.54] [0.97] [-1.17] [-3.02]*** [-0.05]
UNK -0,036 0,356 0,381 0,233 0,046 -0,014
(-0.41) (2.21)** (2.32)** (0.80) (7.44)*** (-1.14)
(-0.18) [1.90]* [1.60]*** [0.75] (3.40)*** [-0.84]
EMP 2,719 -3,234 2,158 -1,413 0,163 -0,154
(3.44)*** (-2.73)*** (3.42)*** (-1.58) (1.53) (-1.00)
[1.86]* [-2.22]** [2.10]** [-1.20] (0.89) [-1.25]
PRO 0,029 -0,024 0,022 -0,008 0,004 -0,002
(5.13)*** (-3.25)*** (4.86)*** (-1.52) (5.02)*** (-1.90)*
[4.51]*** [-3.40]*** [4.51]*** [-1.63] [5.37]*** [-1.54]
GRO -0,770 1,369 -0,384 0,660 -0,082 0,144
(-2.60)*** (3.53)*** (-1.62) (2.15)** (-2.04)** (2.76)***
[-2.28]** [3.63]*** (-1.80)* [2.61]** [-1.44] [2.36]**
WAG -0,049 0,065 -0,030 0,040 -0,005 0,004
(-3.17)*** (2.74)** (-2.45)** (2.07)** (-2.30)** (1.16)
[-2.91]*** [2.69]** [-2.41]** [2.07]** [-2.52]** [1.42]**
PUB 1,419 1,216 1,925 0,542 0,478 0,105
(0.93) (0.95) (1.59) (0.53) (2.30)** (0.62)
[0.54] [0.54] [0.99] [0.33] [1.43] [0.44]






Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity
are reported in square brackets. ***, ** and * indicate coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.Table 6




EDU i,t -0.269 -0.209
(-2.10)** (-1.82)*






WAG i,t 0.002 0.002
(2.12)** (1.46)










In model A the dependent variable is the number of property crimes recorded
in region i at time t; in model B the dependent variable is the number of total
crimes recorded in region i at time t. Both variables are normalised by the size of
the population. Time dummies are included in all models. Standard errors robust
to heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical
signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.